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RESPONDENTS JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Respondent agrees with the Appellant's Jurisdiction Statement 
which appears on page one of her Brief. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Copies of the following are found in the Addendum to this 
Brief. 
§30-3-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
§30-3-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
Rule 103 Utah Rules of Evidence 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. The wife filed a complaint seeking, 
among other things, custody of the parties' three minor children, 
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child support, alimony, an equitable distribution of marital 
property and debts, and an award of attorney's fees. 
The husband answered and counter-claimed requesting mediation 
as it related to custody of the children, an equitable property and 
debt distribution, no award of alimony, and an order requiring each 
party to bear their own fees. 
Both sides conducted discovery, including interrogatories and 
depositions, and the matter was ultimately tried before the 
Honorable David Young on February 11, 1933. Each side testified 
either directly or by way of proffer, called witnesses and 
presented documentary evidence. The trial court ruled from the 
bench. The husband's counsel submitted proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on April 12, 1993. The 
wife's counsel filed Objections to those proposed Findings and 
Conclusions on April 19, 1993. The husband's counsel submitted a 
timely Reply to those objections. On April 29, 1993, the trial 
court denied the wife's objections and entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce as submitted by the 
husband's counsel. In addition, it issued a Minute Entry 
addressing the objections of the wife and inviting either party to 
file a Motion for a New Trial, should either have had any problems 
with the procedure utilized during the trial proceedings. Neither 
side accepted that invitation to file a Motion for New Trial. 
The wife filed her Notice of Appeal on May 26, 1993. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mr. Coelho seeks the following relief in connection with this 
appeal: 
1) For an Order affirming the actions of the trial court in 
all respects. 
2) For an Order affirming the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in all respects. 
3) For an Order granting such other relief as may be fair 
and equitable to Mr. Coelho. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Mrs, Coelho has omitted certain important facts, has 
overemphasized some while under emphasizing others, Mr. Coelho must 
necessarily supplement and clarify her Statement of Facts. Mr. 
Coelho believes that the following Statement of Facts more 
accurately and completely sets forth what transpired in connection 
with the proceedings below: 
Marital and Income History 
At the time of trial, Mrs. Coelho was 40 years old. (R-486) 
The parties married in 1977. Mrs. Coelho had gone to college for 
3 years and had majored in art. (R-4 64) She stopped her college 
education three years before the marriage and did not again attend 
college until after this action for divorce was filed. (R-487) At 
that time, she decided she wanted to be a nurse (R-92) and enrolled 
in a nursing program. (R-489) 
In 1983 she trained and became a licensed real estate agent 
and began working for Coleman Land in Park City, Utah. (R-487) 
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She quickly became successful and during her full time employment 
averaged approximately $35,000.00 per year in net income after her 
business expenses had been deducted. (R-488) She began working 
part time for the company during 1990 and 1991. (R-466; Ex P-l) 
She then decided to become a full time ski instructor at Park 
City. At the time of trial she testified she was making about 
$250.00 per week as an instructor. (R-489) She also said she 
worked about 10 hours per week at Chrysalis, at a public service 
agency. (R-490) She was making $5.50 per hour at that job. (R-
490) Mrs. Coelho stated that during the marriage her average 
monthly income was $1,500.00 and that her average annual income 
from 1983-1991 was approximately $18,000.00 per year. (Exhibit P-
11) The trial court found her monthly income earning capacity to 
be $1,500.00. (R-341) 
She said her time in real estate was "just a job" not a 
career, (R-461) and felt it would take her 5 years to get back 
into that business. (R-477) Exhibit P-ll reflects that in 1983, 
the year she became licensed and started work, she quite quickly 
began earning significant income from selling real estate. She was 
a very successful real estate person and often times said that she 
could make more money than her husband. (R-518) 
She also testified that she liked to spend no less than 15-20 
minutes a day (in the evening) helping Tony, the parties' second 
child, with his school work. (R-459) Tony has an attention 
deficit disorder but is at a normal grade level. (R-459) 
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Even though Mr. Coelho had no construction jobs or income at 
the time of trial, Mrs. Coelho felt that monthly income of 
$9,256.00 should be imputed to him. (R-481) She testified that she 
thought his average monthly income for 1989-1992 should be 
$6,597.00, (R-482) even though thirteen days earlier she had 
suggested in her Financial Declaration filed with the Court, that 
$5,000.00 per month income should be imputed to Mr. Coelho. (R-
291) 
She also introduced Exhibit P-17 in support of her position 
that her husband's income historically had been $6,597.00 per 
month. However, that exhibit contained W-2 income for Mr. Coelho 
not related to his construction business but paid to him for wages 
from employment he was required to take in 198 9 and 1990 in 
Georgia. Eliminating that income from the Exhibit results in an 
average monthly income over the 4 year period of $3,718.00. 
She also acknowledged that when Mr. Coelho was building, they 
lived from one month to the next not knowing how much money they 
would have. (R-470) 
At the time of trial, Mr. Coelho had no ongoing jobs or 
expectancy of jobs in his construction business. (R-517) He 
considered himself to be a small businessman and worked as hard as 
he could. He didn't have sufficient funds to begin any "spec" 
homes and was required to build on a contract by contract basis. 
In 1992 he was able to secure a large contract at the first of the 
year. During the last half of 1992 he earnestly tried to secure 
other contracts but was unable to do so. He was continuously 
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contacting possible business leads and prepared and circulated a 
flier advertizing his company. He listed his company as a 
qualified company with Gump and Ayers in the Park City Area. (R-
517-518) 
The tax returns, (Ex. P-2-10) received into evidence reflect 
the following income figures for Mr. Coelho's construction 
business. 
Year Gross Receipts 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
$101,803 
82,041 
65,169 
95,566 
89,869 
119,037 
34,057 
83,530 
183,474 
TOTAL 
MONTHLY AVERAGE 
Gross Income 
$ 63,198 
64,041 
59,955 
74,228 
55,414 
84,225 
30,942 
69,032 
76,954 
$578,494 
$ 5,356 
Net Profit 
$ 22,690 
33,519 
3,104 
25,462 
3,842 
36,015 
4,610 
42,163 
45,062 
$216,467 
$ 2,004 
He estimated that his average net monthly income would be 
$5,000.00 and agreed to have that monthly sum imputed to him for 
support purposes even though at the time of trial he had no income 
(R-416) . In 1992, he had a good year as a result of the one large 
contract but with the money he had made he serviced the parties' 
line of credit, paid some of the taxes, paid his temporary support 
and in so doing was left with much less for him to live on than he 
was entitled to use under the temporary order. (R-518) He 
estimated his monthly expenses with one child living with him to be 
$3,900.00 (Ex D-25) and acknowledged that given the parties' 
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present income situation, he would have to try and substantially 
reduce those expenses. (R-518-519) 
Both parties testified that they had incurred attorney's fees 
in connection with this matter. (R-483, 520) Mrs. Coelho requested 
reimbursement of all of her fees (R-483) and Mr. Coelho said he was 
in no better position than she when it came to being able to pay 
his fees. (R-520) 
The only real asset the parties had was the marital residence 
valued at $300,000.00 to $370,000.00. (R-408) It had a 
$137,013.00 first trust deed obligation and a $34,391.00 line of 
credit against it. (Exhibit D-24) The parties agreed this home 
should be sold as soon as possible in the hopes that each would 
receive significant cash from which each could find substitute 
housing and meet their respective financial obligations. Mrs. 
Coelho was given an option to purchase Mr. Coelho7s interest based 
upon the possibility that Mrs. Coelho's parents may be a source of 
those funds. (R-410) Mrs. Coelho agreed that Mr. Coelho could 
receive his construction company (R-443) and that it had a value of 
$2,697.00. (Ex. D-24) 
The parties personal and business accountants testified that 
the cash flow from Mr. Coelho's business was erratic at best, (R-
493, 514) and that in 1988 and 1989 Mr. Coelho's income was higher 
because he had worked for a company in Georgia and received W-2 
income. (R-495) 
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Trial Proceedings 
The record reveals that at the beginning of the trial the 
trial court asked the parties what matters could be stipulated to 
and the first portion of the proceedings dealt with the parties 
reaching an agreement on various issues which either were not in 
dispute or resolved during those discussions. (R-396-444) 
The trial court then suggested certain items might be dealt 
with by proffer and that approach was consented to by Mr. Coelho 
and not objected to by Mrs. Coelho. (R-44 5) 
The trial court then asked the parties to identify the 
remaining disputed issues and the parties agreed that those were as 
follows: 
1) What the income of the parties was? 
2) What income should be imputed to each party? 
3) What amount of alimony, if any, should be awarded? 
4) The amount of attorney's fees, if any, that should be 
awarded? (R-445) 
5) Allocation of responsibility for unpaid taxes (R-446) and 
a portion of the line of credit on the marital residence? (R-
415) 
6) Allocation of uncovered health care expenses for Sara and 
Emily? (R-447) 
The trial court then took its first recess and upon 
reconvening was advised that the parties had reached further 
stipulations which were then presented to the court. (R-446-451) 
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It was then that the trial judge mentioned he had another 
appointment at noon. (R-452) Nowhere in the record is there any 
reference that the trial could not continue after the judge had 
fulfilled his other commitments. 
Mrs. Coelho was then asked to go forward with her case and she 
did. She testified, and presented documentary evidence in support 
of her position. (R-452-465) . At the conclusion of her direct 
testimony, her counsel addressed the issue of attorney's fees and 
stated: 
Ms. Saunders: Okay, I think we can probably proffer this 
part. . . and the last exhibit I have is regarding my 
attorney's fees and I can either proffer 'em your honor 
or I can have her discuss 'em. 
Mr. Dart: Proffer is fine. 
Court: Okay. (R-483) 
Then Mr. Coelho's counsel conducted a brief cross examination 
of Mrs. Coelho. (R-486-489) Mrs. Coelho's counsel had no re-
direct and the following exchange occurred: 
Judge Young: Thank you. Do you have any other 
witnesses Ms. Saunders? 
Ms. Saunders: No. (R-491) 
Mr. Coelho then began the presentation of his case and called 
two accountants who had done accounting work and tax returns for 
the parties during the marriage. Both were cross-examined by Mrs. 
Coelho's counsel. (R-498-501; 510-516) Exhibits were received 
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related to the historical income of the parties and Mr. Coelho's 
construction company. (Ex. D-21, 22 & 23) 
The trial court then asked Mr. Dart to proffer the testimony 
of Mr. Coelho. (R-517, 518) Mrs. Coelho's counsel did not object 
to using this procedure. At the conclusion, Ms. Saunders consented 
to the proffer, (R-518) and did not request the right to cross-
examine. In fact she stated: 
Mr. Dart: . . .That would be our proffer as to his 
testimony. 
Judge Young: All right. Do you have any difficulty 
that would be his testimony if he were called to 
testify? 
Ms. Saunders: No. (R-519) 
Mr. Coelho then offered three Exhibits related to: 
a) Mr. Coelho's proposed Distribution of Assets and 
Liabilities; 
b) His monthly living expenses; and 
c) His proposed child support worksheet (Exhibits D-24, 
25, 8c 26. 
The trial court asked Mrs. Coelho's counsel whether she had any 
objections to those exhibits as being illustrative of Mr. Coelho's 
testimony. She said no and agreed that these would be illustrative 
of his testimony. (R-520) . She did not aisk to cross-examine and 
the exhibits were admitted. (R-520) 
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Mr. Coelho's counsel then submitted a proffer related to Mr. 
Coelho's attorney's fees (R-520) and again no objection or request 
to cross-examine was made by Mrs. Coelho. 
At this point neither side had further evidence and a 
discussion occurred about closing argument. 
Mr. Dart: J am prepared to waive argument if counsel 
will. If counsel feels it necessary I would accommodate 
coming tomorrow. 
Ms. Saunders: I think the Judge has a pretty good handle 
on what's going on and I think the paperwork will help 
him out. (R-521 Emphasis added) 
The trial judge then asked each side to proffer what each 
believed should be imputed as income and their respective basis for 
alimony calculations. (R-521) Each side voluntarily did so 
without objection (R-522, 523) and after that, the trial court 
indicated that it was then ready to rule on the remaining disputed 
issues. (R-531) 
At no time during these proceedings did either side object to 
the procedure being used and in fact each side specifically 
consented to and used the proffer procedure in the presentation of 
their respective cases. 
The first time the issues of inadequate time, inability to 
cross-examine, and use of the proffer procedure was raised was 
approximately two and an half months after trial when Mrs. Coelho 
filed Objections to Mr. Coelho's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R-312) 
11 
In considering those untimely objections the trial court was 
sensitive to insuring that each party felt they had been given 
sufficient time to present their case and stated in its Minute 
Entry of April 29, 1993: 
Further the Court states that within the 
plaintiff's Objections there is language 
expressing concern as to the "limited time" 
allowed for the hearing. Tne Defendant' s 
response in part suggests that the Objections 
of the Plaintiff are designed, in part, to 
increase the "vulnerability11 of the Court's 
decision on appeal. The Court states that it 
too felt concern as to the "time" available for trial. The day happened to be a day on 
which the Chief Justice called a special 
meeting of the Judicial Council of which the 
undersigned is a member. As it turned out, I 
was one and one-half hours late for the 
meeting. 
In order to consider the magnitude of the 
concern, the Court invites a Motion for a New 
Trial to be filed and argued if that remains a 
concern. The court notes that there was no 
timely objection to the procedure on the day 
of the trial but nevertheless would like to 
consider the present concerns of the parties 
as to the adequacy of their presentations. 
Neither party should presume as to the Court's 
present view in considering a New Trial. The 
present concern of the Court is to determine 
if either party believes they did not have an 
adequate opportunity to present their case and 
each should state what they would request, if 
anything, to be further presented to the 
court. (R-330-331) 
Mrs. Coelho voluntarily chose not to avail herself of the 
opportunity afforded by the trial court to correct any such errors 
(See page 13, Appellant's Brief) . She simply filed an appeal which 
urges as a major issue, irregularities in the proceedings below. 
(See Point I Appellant's Brief) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I 
Mrs. Coelho consented to and participated in the procedure 
utilized during the trial of this matter. She made proffers of 
proof and consented to proffers made by Mr. Coelho. Further she 
failed to timely object to the manner in which the trial was 
conducted to provide the trial court an opportunity to correct any 
alleged error. Finally when the trial court was first alerted to 
Mrs. Coelho's concern, she was invited to file a Motion for New 
Trial so that that concern could be addressed and she voluntarily 
chose not to. Point I of her Brief is without merit. 
Point II 
Mrs. Coelho claims that a the trial court erred in failing to 
admit into evidence certain building permit summaries. At trial 
she said she was offering the summaries to show that work was going 
on in the Park City area. Mr. Coelho admitted that work was going 
on in the area but that none of it was coming his way. The trial 
court is given considerable discretion in deciding what is or is 
not relevant evidence. The trial court was correct in ruling that 
the proposed evidence was not relevant. 
Point III 
Mrs. Coelho's reliance on a statement by the trial court that 
it was not going to review certain back up documents is misplaced. 
Each side submitted summary exhibits which contained summaries of 
the financial information contained in the underlying back up 
documents. The accuracy of the information which served as a basis 
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for the summary exhibits was not challenged and as a result the 
trial court had a right to rely on the information contained in the 
summary exhibits in making its decisions on the disputed issues. 
Point IV 
A trial court has broad discretion in fashioning equitable 
remedies in divorce actions, and its decision will not be disturbed 
unless it is clearly unjust. Mrs. Coelho has failed to demonstrate 
that the trial court's decision related to the issues of income 
imputation, support, debt distribution and attorney's fees was 
clearly unjust. Mrs. Coelho has failed to marshall all of the 
evidence in support of the trial court's decision and then 
demonstrate that that evidence was insufficient to support the 
trial court's decision. There was substantial evidence in support 
of imputing income to both parties in the amounts determined to be 
fair to both parties based upon their respective skills, earning 
history, present earnings and earning capabilities. Since the 
trial court did not err in imputing income, its awards of child 
support and alimony were fair under the circumstances. Mrs. Coelho 
presented no evidence in connection with the home equity line of 
credit or tax obligations. Mr. Coelho did. Based on the evidence 
before it and the presumption that the marital estate is to be 
divided equally, the trial court did not err in the way it dealt 
with these two debts. 
Finally, given the income and earning capacities of the 
parties, their respective obligations and the resources ultimately 
available to them from the property distribution, the trial court 
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did not err in requiring Mr. Coelho to contribute $3,000.00 towards 
Mrs. Coelho's fees. 
There is substantial evidence in the record to support these 
awards and the Findings accurately and adequately set forth that 
evidence. 
POINT I 
MRS. COELHO'S CLAIM OF ERROR IN THE 
PROCEDURE UTILIZED IN THE TRIAL OF 
THIS CASE IS WITHOUT MERIT 
The thrust of Point I of Mrs. Coelho7s Brief is that she 1) 
had inadequate time to present her case, 2) was prohibited from 
calling witnesses and 3)was not given the opportunity to cross 
examine Mr. Coelho. The record however reveals this not to be the 
case as has been previously illustrated in the Statement of Facts 
of this Brief. 
A. 
MRS. COELHO CONSENTED TO AND 
PARTICIPATED IN PROFFERING OF 
EVIDENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT 
When a party to a proceeding consents to and participates in 
a particular manner of presenting a case to a trial court, that 
party should not later be allowed to claim on appeal that the 
procedure used at trial was erroneous and prejudicial, thereby 
justifying a review and reversal of any decision that may have been 
the outcome of any such procedure. [(See Delipsev v. Delipsey, 369 
S.W.2d 828, (CCA Tex. 1963)] 
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In this case both parties consented to and used proffers in 
the presentation of their respective cases and neither should now 
be allowed to claim that the use of the same in some way unfairly 
"tainted" the result of those proceedings. 
Mrs. Coelho also argues in her Brief that she was prevented 
from calling witnesses in connection with the presentation of her 
case. Nowhere in the record is there anything to support that 
claim. In fact, when Mrs. Coelho was finished testifying and Mrs. 
Coelho7s counsel had proffered her testimony on attorney's fees, 
the trial court specifically asked if she had any other witnesses 
and she said "No". (R-491) 
Mrs. Coelho directly and implicitly agreed to the use of 
proffers and should not now be allowed to argue that their use in 
this case, in some way restricted her abilities to adequately 
present her case. If she did not approve of the procedure which 
was used, she certainly had a duty to not participate in the 
procedure and to timely object to it. 
B. 
MRS. COELHO FAILED TO TIMELY RAISE 
ANY OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL COURT 
PROCEDURE 
At no time during the trial of this matter did Mrs. Coelho 
raise any objection to the manner in which the trial was being 
conducted. The first mention of any claimed irregularities 
appeared in Mr. Coelho's Objections to Mr. Coelho's Proposed 
Findings. (R-312,313) 
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As was stated in Callan v. Bierman, 194 Kan. 219, 398 P.2d 
355, (1965), a case cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Beehive Medical Electronics v. Square D Company, 669 P.2d 859, 
861 Ftnt 5, (Utah 1983) 
The approved practice of dealing 
with trial errors is to make timely 
objection to them as they arise. 
Fairness to the court should prompt 
counsel to call attention to such 
errors seasonably, and he may be 
held to waive his right to relief 
where his conduct, expressions or 
silence shows acquiescence in an 
erroneous declaration of law or 
evinces a purpose to take advantage 
of unguarded expressions that would 
have been promptly corrected if 
pointed out. (Boucher v. Roberts, 
187 Kan. 675 678, 359 P.2d 830; 
Browning v. Lefever, 191 Kan. 397, 
400, 381 P. 2d 524; Farmers Union 
Central Cooperative Exchange v. 
Tomson, 192 Kan. 274, 387 P.2d 202) 
[Callan, at 357] 
In this case, Mrs. Coelho did not raise timely objections and 
consequently she should be precluded from now raising these issues 
on appeal. 
C. 
MRS. COELHO WAS GIVEN THE 
OPPORTUNITY BY THE TRIAL COURT TO 
HAVE A FURTHER HEARING OR NEW TRIAL 
BASED ON HER CLAIM OF IRREGULARITIES 
AND SHE CHOSE NOT TO DO SO 
Perhaps the most compelling reason not to consider the issues 
raised in Point I of Mrs. Coelho's brief is the fact that when the 
trial court was finally alerted as to the problems Mrs. Coelho 
claimed occurred during trial (over two months after the trial had 
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ended) , it urged either party to file a Motion for New Trial and in 
its Minute Entry (R-330) stated: 
In order to consider the 
magnitude of the concern, the Court 
invites a Motion for a New Trial to 
be filed and argued if it remains a 
concern. The court notes that there 
was no timely objection to the 
procedure on the day of the trial 
but nevertheless would like to 
consider the present concerns of the 
parties as to the adequacy of their 
presentations. Neither party should 
presume as to the Court's present 
view in considering a New Trial. 
The present concern of the Court is 
to determine if either party 
believes they did not have an 
adequate opportunity to present 
their case and each should state 
what they would request, if 
anything, to be further presented to 
the court. (R-330, 331) Emphasis 
added. 
The only response and reference to that invitation is found on 
page 13 of Mrs. Coelho's Brief where she states: 
In light of the hurried nature of 
the trial itself, Mrs. Coelho did 
not believe that she would gain any 
benefit by filing a motion for a new 
trial and did not pursue that 
course. In addition, with more than 
$7,000.00 in attorney's fees and 
costs that the court ordered her to 
bear, it was economically 
prohibitive for her to consider 
further proceedings in the lower 
court. This decision was not 
unreasonable. I.D. 
It is not for Mrs. Coelho to unilaterally decide that her 
decision to not attempt to correct an error of the trial court at 
the trial court level was reasonable. To the contrary, it is 
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reasonable to try and correct such errors below and thereby avoid 
an appeal. 
In short, in considering the arguments raised in Point I of 
Mrs. Coelho's Brief vis a vis' what occurred at trial it is fair to 
conclude that: 
1) Mrs. Coelho stipulated and agreed to the trial 
procedures; 
2) By not objecting, she waived her right to now claim error 
in connection with the procedure; and/or 
3) She is now estopped from claiming error because of her 
failure to move for a new trial as was suggested by the trial 
court. 
Point I of Mrs. Coelho's brief is without merit. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN THE MANNER IT DEALT WITH 
SUMMARIES OF BUILDING PERMITS IN THE 
PARK CITY AREA 
Mrs. Coelho claims reversible error because the trial court 
refused to admit summaries of building permits issued in the Park 
City area. When these were offered during the presentation of Mrs. 
Coelho's case, Mr. Coelho's counsel indicated he would not raise a 
foundational objection but would object on the grounds of 
relevancy. (R-485-486) The trial court sustained the objection 
and in the process, the following is the full text of the exchange 
which occurred between the court and counsel. 
19 
Ms. Saunders:.. .And then I believe 
that I have two other exhibits that 
I'm not sure of the status of them 
and they are the Park City Building 
permits and the Summit County 
Building permits. 
Judge Young: Is your objection to 
those on relevance, Mr. Dart? 
Mr. Dart: I do not object on foundation, I do object on 
relevance. 
Ms. Saunders: And I would say . . . 
Judge Young: Well, I can't even 
begin to believe that I would be 
making a decision on the basis of 
the building permits that are 
offered in Park City. There are so 
many variables as to whether those 
building permits are comparable, 
whether he could do that kind of 
work, whether he is the one that 
solely gets a building permit. I 
mean, whether there's limited 
industry. There are just too many 
variables for me to make a decision 
on that basis. 
Ms. Saunders: Okay. My cnly point 
in showing it, irrespective of how 
the court rules, and this is for the 
record, it is to show if Mr. Coelho 
claims there is no work available in 
Summit County or Park City that 
there is certainly a great amount of 
activity that goes on, and whether 
he qualifies under it or not there's 
still work there. 
Judge Young: I don't think 
anybody's making a claim there is no 
work going on in Park City, are you, 
Mr. Dart? 
Mr. Dart: No, we're not making that 
claim at all. 
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Judge Young: The objection on the 
basis or relevance is sustained. 
(R-485-486) 
A trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding 
whether or not evidence is relevant. [(See Bambrough v. Bethers, 
552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976)] 
In her Brief, Mrs. Coelho argues that her evidence related to 
what work was "available" in the Park City Area. At trial however, 
she argued that she was offering to show that there was work going 
on in the Park City area. Mr. Coelho did not claim that there was 
not work going on in the Park City area, but only that he could not 
seem to get any of it. There is a significant difference between 
the concept of work going on in a particular area and whether that 
work might be "available" to a particular person. The trial court 
correctly acknowledged and Mr. Coelho agreed that work was going on 
in the area, but without more which would demonstrate that some of 
that work was specifically available to Mr. Coelho, the trial court 
correctly ruled that the evidence as proffered was not relevant. 
Further, Mr. Coelho even went so far as to agree that while he 
presently had no income coming in and was uncertain as to how much 
income he might expect to receive in the future, he was still 
willing to have $5,000.00 per month inn income imputed to him. 
Since he did not claim there was no work available, the 
purpose for which Mrs. Coelho was offering the evidence was 
eliminated thereby making the evidence irrelevant. 
In addition, even if the trial court's ruling on this 
evidence was erroneous Mrs. Coelho cannot claim error because she 
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has failed to demonstrate that its exclusion affected a substantial 
right of hers. 
Rule 103 Utah Rules of Evidence states in pertinent part: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. 
Error may not be predicted upon a 
ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right 
of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case 
the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a 
timely objection or 
motion to strike appears 
of record, stating the 
specific ground of 
objection, if the 
specific ground was not 
apparent from the 
context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In 
case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence 
was made known to the 
court by offer or was 
apparent from the context 
within which questions 
were asked. I.D. 
In this case, the trial court did not cibuse its discretion in 
refusing to admit the summaries and gave sound and correct reasons 
for so doing. (R-485) The logic of the trial court in refusing 
to admit this evidence is well reasoned and Mrs. Coelho's claim of 
reversible error on this basis is without merit. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVIEWED 
AND CONSIDERED THE DOCUMENTARY 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO IT 
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In Point II of her Brief, Mrs. Coelho places great weight on 
a statement made by the trial court that it was not "going to go 
through the back up documents and the checks and the tax returns 
and the other documents". (R-521) Perhaps such a claim would have 
merit if the parties had not submitted exhibits which summarized 
all of the income and financial information contained in those 
underlying documents. (See Plaintiff's Exhibits 11, 16, 17 and 
Defendant's Exhibits 22 and 23) In this case, those summaries were 
submitted and the court had the right to rely on the accuracy of 
the same. In the course of this trial, the court received and 
reviewed each of those exhibits as they were offered. 
Further, a review of the record reflects that the trial court 
was very familiar with the financial issues and respective incomes 
of the parties. Even Mrs. Coelho's counsel said she felt "the 
judge has a pretty good handle on what's going on. . ." (R-521) 
Also, prior to his ruling, the trial judge engaged in an extensive 
interchange with Mrs. Coelho's counsel over her use of an eight 
year average of Mrs. Coelho' s income and a four year average of Mr. 
Coelho's income in attempting to establish historical earnings and 
impute income. (R-529-531) 
Parenthetically, if this were such a great concern to Mrs. 
Coelho, she was obligated to raise an objection at that time so 
that the trial court could consider her concern. She did not do 
so. 
The record reflects a full understanding by the trial court of 
the financial information of the parties gathered from the 
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testimony of the witnesses and a review of the summary exhibits 
submitted by both sides. Mrs. Coelho's claim of error on this 
basis is likewise without merit. 
POINT IV 
IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS THE TRIAL 
COURT HAS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION 
CONCERNING SUPPORT AWARDS, 
PROPERTY/DEBT DISTRIBUTIONS AND 
ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION WILL NOT BE 
DISTURBED UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY 
UNJUST OR A CLEAR ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION 
In divorce actions a trial court is vested with considerable 
and broad discretion in fashioning fair and equitable remedies for 
the parties on the issues of support, property/debt distributions 
and attorney's fees. Its decisions will not be changed by the 
appellate court unless it can be demonstrated that the decision is 
clearly unjust or there was a clear abuse of discretion. Walters 
v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991) 
In order to meet this burden, Mrs. Coelho must first marshall 
all of the evidence which supports the trial court's reasoning and 
decision and then demonstrate that that evidence, when viewed in a 
light most favorable to the findings, is insufficient to support 
the findings or is clearly erroneous. 
To mount a successful attack on the 
trial court's factual findings, an 
appellant must marshall all the 
evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable 
to the findings, the evidence is 
evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings, Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), or 
that its findings are otherwise 
clearly erroneous. A finding is 
clearly erroneous when, even though 
there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court is 'left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed." State 
v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987) . This court does not consider 
evidence de novo, so the mere fact 
that we might reach a different 
result than the trial court on the 
same evidence does not justify 
setting aside the trial court's findings. Schindler v. Schindler. 
776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah 1989) 
Mrs. Coelho's Brief and accompanying arguments fail to satisfy 
the "marshalling" requirements of Schindler, supra, and on this 
basis alone her appeal of the income, support, debt allocation and 
attorney's fee issues is fatally defective. 
In addition, it appears that Mrs. Coelho is operating under a 
misconception as to what constitutes fact and what is evidence. 
Simply because she presented evidence to the court in support of 
her position, does not automatically require the court to treat 
that evidence as fact. In this case, the record reflects that the 
trial court accepted evidence from both sides, weighed that 
evidence and then found facts upon which to fashion remedies fair 
and equitable to both sides. It is not an error for a trial court 
to discount or not even consider evidence offered by one side or 
the other. In fact, it is the trial court's duty to analyze 
conflicting evidence in the process of determining what the 
ultimate facts are. 
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A. 
FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
The actual financial circumstances oE the parties at the time 
of trial was bleak to say the least. Mr. Coelho had no income and 
no real prospects of income and Mrs. Coelho was earning $1,200 to 
$1,400.00 per month gross and $1,100.00 per month net. 
Mr. Coelho was attempting to secure construction projects and 
thought he would be able to average $5,000.00 per month in earnings 
once he found some work. Mrs. Coelho's position as to what income 
should be imputed to Mr. Coelho's went from $5,000.00 per month in 
her Financial Declaration, (R- 291) to $9,256.00 per month (R-481) 
and $6,500.00 per month during her testimony. (R-522) 
Mrs. Coelho had in the past, consistently earned $3,000.00 per 
month after expenses, as a successful real estate salesperson. 
(R-488) She voluntarily decided she didn't want to do that and 
instead elected to teach skiing at a significant reduction in pay. 
She said she felt $1,3 00.00 per month was a fair figure to impute 
to her as income from what she now had elected to do with her time. 
(R-522) 
The evidence as to what each party was actually earning or 
capable of earning was conflicting. Because of this, the trial 
court did what it was required to do in weighing conflicting 
evidence and then finding facts allowing it to fashion a remedy 
fair to both parties. 
Paragraph eight of the Court's Findings entitled "Income 
Determination" clearly sets forth what the court considered in 
arriving at what income was to be imputed to both parties. (R-340) 
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As such, the finding is correct, supported by credible evidence and 
should not be subject to challenge on appeal. 
B. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
The trial court's Findings and Conclusions regarding child 
support must necessarily rest on what the court found the income of 
the parties to be or what it determined each party was capable of 
earning. Once that was done the determination of child support 
became a mathematical calculation under the Child Support 
Guidelines. 
In this case, the parties stipulated that child support would 
be calculated under the Guidelines based upon the income the court 
determined to be attributable to each party. (R-442) 
In order for Mrs. Coelho to be successful in challenging the 
adequacy of child support, as she has attempted to argue in Point 
III B of her Brief, she must first demonstrate that the court erred 
in determining the parties respective incomes. As pointed out in 
Section A. above, she has failed in that attempt and therefore her 
argument that child support should be increased, based on what she 
thought should be imputed as income, is likewise without merit. 
C. 
ALIMONY 
Mrs. Coelho argues that the trial court's Findings related to 
the alimony issue were inadequate and that the award was 
insufficient as to both the amount and duration. Each of these 
claims is without merit. 
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In its Findings on alimony, (paragraph 8) the court refers to 
its other findings on income determination which sets forth its 
rationale in arriving at what would be a fair amount to award by 
way of alimony. (R-344) The Findings reflect that the court 
considered what each party was actually earning; what each party 
was capable of earning based on historical income figures, and what 
each party's respective needs and expenses were. (R-340, 341, 344) 
The $1,000.00 per month amount was the best the trial court 
could do given the fact that there was not enough money to meet 
each of the parties monthly expenses. (Exhibits P-14, D-25) It is 
important to note that as of the date of: trial, Mr. Coelho was 
earning no moneys and yet the court required him to pay over 
$1,600.00 per month in support. At the time of trial, Mrs. Coelho 
was actually earning $1,100 to $1,200.00 per month. The result of 
this award was to give Mrs. Coelho approximately $2,700.00 per 
month, in actual cash, to assist in meeting her monthly expenses. 
On the other hand, Mr. Coelho was required to pay his monthly 
expenses from income which simply did not exist but which had been 
imputed to him. That meant that the only way he could meet his 
support obligations and support himself was to borrow money until 
his company found work and again began generating income. If 
anyone got the "short end" on the support issue, it was Mr. 
Coelho, not Mrs. Coelho. The trial court did not err in the amount 
of alimony it awarded. 
Mrs. Coelho also claims the trial court erred by limiting the 
alimony award to one year. This is an incorrect characterization 
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of what the trial court actually did. In fact, what the court did 
was to award the $1,000.00 per month with the understanding that 
the issue as to whether it was sufficient, and would continue and 
become permanent in nature to be reserved for further hearing in 
one year if Mrs. Coelho desired a review of the same. In so 
ordering, the trial court stated: 
Now, under the circumstances of the 
present situation with the parties the 
court finds that it is appropriate to 
award alimony and the court awards 
alimony at the level of $1,000.00 per 
month for a period of one year. At the 
conclusion of that one year the alimony 
will be re-evaluated and the court will 
determine whether- -and I am goincr to 
reserve the issue of whether it should be 
made permanent or not, until that 
opportunity to look at it at that time. 
(R-532, Emphasis added) 
Because the trial court found that Mrs. Coelho was voluntarily 
underemployed and imputed income to both parties when in fact Mr. 
Coelho had no regular income at the time of trial, reserving the 
issues of amount and duration was the only reasonable approach to 
take under the evidence which was presented by the parties. 
This case differs from the traditional support case because of 
the underemployment and imputation of income issues. By fashioning 
this remedy with a reasonably brief review period the trial court 
provided each party with an opportunity to demonstrate the adequacy 
or inadequacy of the amount and whether or not any permanent 
alimony at all was appropriate. 
It is important to keep in mind that Mrs. Coelho requested 
$1,950.00 in alimony (R-522) and Mr. Coelho, because of Mrs. 
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Coelho's abilities and the amounts she had been able to earn as a 
real estate agent, felt no alimony should be awarded. (R-523) 
Given these diametrically opposed positions, the trial court acted 
wisely and well within its discretion to simply reserve the issue 
of permanence and allow revisiting of the amount within the one 
year period. No error on the part of the trial court was committed 
in the way it dealt with this issue and the evidence presented was 
more than sufficient to support the trial court's Finding on this 
issue. 
D. 
EQUITY LINE MORTGAGE AND TAX LIABILITIES 
In Point IV of Mrs. Coelho's Brief, she acknowledges that the 
trial court is given broad discretion in allocating marital debt 
and then argues that it abused that discretion by ordering the 
parties to equally share the obligation of the home equity line and 
the parties income tax liabilities for the 1992 tax year. 
However, in considering that argument, it is first critical to 
analyze what evidence was presented on these two debts. 
Mrs. Coelho presented no evidence by way of proffer or direct 
testimony on the line of credit other than a reference to a 
$5,200.00 line of credit "withdrawal" on exhibit P-16 and a 
$5,200.00 line of credit "Deposit and Payment" and exhibit P-17. 
On the other hand, Mr. Coelho's exhibit D-24 specifically sets 
forth the current balance on the line and requested that it be 
allocated equally between the parties. (R-520) 
Likewise, Mrs. Coelho offered no evidence on the 1992 tax 
liability and how it should be allocated. The only evidence before 
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the trial court on this issue was exhibit D-24 which set forth the 
amount of $15,931.00 due in taxes and his request that that debt be 
shared equally. (R-520) 
In reaching a decision on how to fairly allocate these debts 
in a property distribution the trial court was required to adhere 
to and apply two general legal principles established by the Utah 
appellate courts. 
First, it followed the general rule that a marital estate 
should be valued as of the date of trial. Berger v. Beraer, 713 
P.2d 695 (Utah 1985) Mrs. Coelho presented no evidence as to why 
any alternative valuation date would be appropriate and in fact the 
only evidence the trial court had before it was the current 
balances of the two marital obligations in question. Based on 
that, the trial court was correct in finding and concluding that 
the present balances of these debts were the balances to use in its 
analysis of a fair property/debt distribution. 
Second, once the balances had been determined, Utah law 
creates a presumption that the marital estate should be divided and 
allocated equally between the parties. [See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 
1314, 1322 (Utah App. 1990)] Again, Mrs. Coelho presented no 
evidence to overcome that presumption and consequently the trial 
court was very correct in allocating these debts equally between 
the parties. 
Further,.the remedy fashioned by the trial court in allocating 
these debts equally between the parties was most fair under the 
circumstances of this case. Both debts were debts which each party 
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had derived benefit from during the marriage. The only real asset 
of the marriage was the marital residence which the parties agreed 
would be sold and the proceeds then divided equally. That sale 
would generate substantial monies sufficient to pay these two 
marital obligations and still leave enough for each party to 
acquire a new residence for herself/himself and the children who 
would be residing with each. 
What the trial court did, in effect, was to make certain that 
all marital debts were paid from marital assets and each party was 
then given a "fresh start", free from debt, to establish a 
household on their own with the further requirement that Mr. Coelho 
assist Mrs. Coelho financially by way of ongoing child support and 
alimony. 
To have required Mr. Coelho to assume these obligations and 
still pay support to Mrs. Coelho would have been unfair and 
inequitable to Mr. Coelho. To have allocated these debts equally 
and then not required Mr. Coelho to pay support to Mrs. Coelho 
would have been unfair and inequitable to Mrs. Coelho. In essence 
the trial court, by doing what it did, fashioned a remedy that was 
fair to both parties. 
Mrs. Coelho's claim that the trial court erred in allocating 
these debts as it did is without merit because of her failure to 
produce any evidence as to the amount of these debts and how they 
should be allocated. The trial court acted well within its 
discretion based on the evidence which was presented to it. 
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E. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In Point V of her Brief, Mrs. Coelho again acknowledges the 
broad discretion of the trial court in connection with awarding 
attorney's fees in divorce actions. She then proceeds to argue 
that because the amount and reasonableness of the fees were 
undisputed and there was no evidence to support an award of less 
than all of her fees, that a fortiori the trial court erred in not 
awarding all of those fees. The flaw in this argument rests in the 
second element. 
There was substantial evidence to support a finding granting 
Mrs. Coelho only a portion of her requested fees. She was under-
employed, (R-340, 341) and capable of earning $35,000.00 per year. 
(R-488) At the time of trial, Mr. Coelho was not earning 
anything. (R- 517, 518) The home of the parties was to be sold 
resulting in substantial cash coming to both parties. (R-335-337) 
Mr. Coelho had his own attorney's fees to pay. (R-519) Both 
parties' monthly expenses were similar (Exhibit P-14 and D-25) 
It was apparent that once the home sold each party would have 
substantial monies from her/his share of the equity which was to be 
divided. 
Based upon the circumstances of this cases, the trial court 
would have been well within its discretion to have required each 
party to pay their own fees. However, again in fashioning a remedy 
fair to both parties, and after considering what monies would 
ultimately be available to the parties, what income each party was 
capable of earning and what support Mr. Coelho was required to pay, 
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the trial court exercised its broad discretion and ordered Mr. 
Coelho to contribute $3,000.00 towards Mrs. Coelho7s fees. (R-344, 
345) 
As is required, the trial court considered the reasonableness 
of the fee being requested and the abilities/need of each party to 
pay their own fees and those considerations are clearly reflected 
in the Findings. [(See paragraphs 5, 8, 11 & 13 (R-335-338, 344-
346)] The trial court followed the requirements set out in Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P. 2d 494 (Utah App. 1991) . Its award was based upon the 
evidence presented at trial related not only to the specific issue 
of attorney's fees but to the overall financial circumstances of 
the parties. 
Mrs. Coelho7s reliance upon Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 
(Utah App. 1990) is misplaced in that the trial court in this case 
awarded fees less than the amount requested and specifically set 
forth in its Findings the reasons for doing so. It specifically 
considered the abilities of both parties to pay their own fees and 
the fact that Mr. Coelho was going to be required to pay his own 
fees. Having found that justification, the trial court acted well 
within its discretion in awarding less fees than Mrs. Coelho had 
requested. 
Mrs. Coelho7s claim of error regarding the trial court's award 
of attorney7s fees is without merit. There was adequate evidence 
in the record to support the award and the Findings properly set 
forth the evidence upon which the trial court based its award. 
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CONCLUSION 
Both parties were given the opportunity for a fair trial in 
this matter. Mrs. Coelho's claim of irregularities in the conduct 
of the trial is without merit. She consented to and participated 
in the trial procedure, did not object to that procedure and did 
not take advantage of an opportunity to rectify any such claim of 
error prior to pursuing this appeal. 
The trial court properly excluded evidence which was not 
relevant to the issues before the court and it committed no error 
in its review and consideration of documentary evidence presented 
by the parties. 
The trial court did not abuse the wide discretion afforded it 
in fashioning an overall remedy fair to both parties as it related 
to income imputation, support, debt allocation and attorney's fees. 
There was more than evidence to support the trial court's Findings 
and the Findings properly reflect that evidence. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed in all 
respects. , ^ 
Respectfully submitted this / x/^ day of January, 1994. 
DART,y^DAMSON & D^OVAN^^ > 
Attorney for 1/ 
Defendant/Respondent 
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and heal th 
care of parties and children — Division of debts 
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meri-
torious -petition for modification [Effective until 
January 1, 1994]. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment 
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and neces-
sary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order 
by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursu-
ant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted 
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because 
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation 
A -
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Tem-
porary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter c, 4, or 6, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or 
enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to 
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support 
and maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the 
other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order 
or judgment. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-3, enacted by L. either part} to pay for the separate support 
1993, ch. 137, § 1. and maintenance of the adverse party and the 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1993, children, and enacts the present section, effec-
ch. 72, § 10 repeals former § 30-3-3, Utah tive May 3, 1993 
Code Annotated 1953, allowing a court to order 
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Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity 
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and Utah case law not involving constitutional 
considerations Subsection (a)(1) is in accord 
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros , 20 Utah 2d 
421, 439 P 2d 279 (1968) See also Bradford v. 
Alvey & Sons, 621 P2d 1240 (Utah 1980); 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P 2d 1082 (Utah 
1981). Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain 
error rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 
P.2d 512 (1968). 
Cross-References. — Harmless error in ad-
mission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61, 
URCP. 
A-3 
No. 
B. L. DART (818) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 * . . . 
F I L E D 
APR 29 1993 
Q»ri il Svnmi* County 
OtvtrCtmk Jh-'iS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
MARY COELHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALCIDES J. COELHO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 11093 
Judge Young 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on Thursday, the 11th day of February, 1993, at the hour of 9:00 
a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Evelyn R. 
Saunders, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorney 
B. L. Dart, and plaintiff having testified and two accountants 
having testified and defendant's testimony having been proffered 
and other matters were submitted by proffer and the Court having 
received exhibits and the matter having been submitted and the 
Court being fully advised, hereby makes the following: 
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FINDINGS OP PACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant were married in Park City, 
Utah on the 16th day of July, 1977, and since that time have been 
husband and wife. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are both residents of 
Summit County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three 
months immediately prior to the filing of this action for 
divorce. 
3. Grounds. Differences have arisen between the 
parties which have made it impossible for them to continue with 
this marriage relationship. The parties have been separated 
since October, 1991, and the Court finds that grounds exist for 
entry of a Decree of Divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
4. Custody and Visitation. Three children have been 
born as issue of this marriage: Sara, born August 7, 1978, who 
is 14 years of age; Tony, born August 19, 1980, who is 12 years 
of age; and Emily, born September 29, 1986, who is six years of 
age. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties and consistent with 
the child custody evaluation filed in this action, plaintiff 
should be awarded the care, custody and control of Emily and 
Tony, subject to defendant's reasonable rights of visitation, 
which should be as follows: 
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a. The right to have these two younger children, 
each Monday evening from 5:00 p.m. to 8 p.m. for CCD and so long 
as they are attending CCD. 
b. The right to have the two younger children 
each Wednesday evening from 5:00 p.m. until Thursday morning and 
then take them to school. 
c. The right to have the two younger children 
each Saturday evening from 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
d. The right to have all three children each 
Christmas Day from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
e. All other major holidays to be alternated 
between the parties. 
f. During the summer school vacation period, the 
visitation schedule should change to alternating weekends and be 
adjusted so that all three children are together each weekend. 
g. The right to be informed of and attend all 
school activities, school performance and any extracurricular 
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting 
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have 
input into the important educational decisions of the children, 
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and the 
right to be informed of non-emergency medical problems within 48 
hours. 
h. Such other visitation upon which the parties 
can mutually agree. 
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Custody of Sara should be awarded to defendant 
subject to plaintiff reasonable and liberal rights of visitation 
as follows: 
a. The right to have Sara Thursday evenings at 
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
b. The right to have Sara each Christmas Eve 
from 5:00 p.m. to Christmas Day at 9:00 a.m. 
c. Major holidays to be alternated between the 
parties. 
d. Alternating weekends during the summer school 
vacation period to coordinate with the two younger children so 
that all three children are together each weekend. 
e. The right to be informed of and attend all 
school activities, school performance and any extracurricular 
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting 
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have 
input into the important educational decisions of the children, 
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and to 
be informed of any emergency health-care problems and the right 
to be informed of non-emergency medical problems within 48 hours. 
f. Such other visitation upon which the parties 
can mutually agree. 
5. Real Property. The house and real property 
located at 5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, Utah, should be listed 
for sale with a real estate agent mutually acceptable to the 
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parties, and a listing price to be arrived at between the parties 
in consultation with said real estate agent. Upon the sale of 
said house and real property, and after payment of the first 
mortgage obligation to Valley National Mortgage Co. which has a 
current balance of $137,000, the second mortgage line-of-credit 
to Valley Bank which have a current balance of $34,400, expenses 
of sale and any out-of-pocket expenses of either party necessary 
to place the home in marketable condition, and any moving 
expenses of plaintiff up to the amount of $5,000, any remaining 
equity should be divided equally betv/een the parties. An 
exception to out-of-pocket expenses v/ould be that any painting 
paid for by defendant should be without reimbursement up to the 
amount of $1,2 00. 
a. Plaintiff should have an option for 3 0 days 
from the 11th day of February, 1993, to retain said house and 
real property upon payment to defendant of his equity in the 
property which payment should be made within 3 0 days from the 
time of the exercise of the option. Defendant's equity should be 
established as one-half of the remaining amount after deducting 
the first and second mortgage obligations from the sum of 
$300,000, the appraised value of said house and real property. 
Plaintiff's option should be an exclusion from the listing of 
this property so that in the exercise of this option, no real 
estate commission will be incurred. 
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Plaintiff should have the further option of 
having the right of first refusal in the event of an offer by a 
third party on the home upon the same terms as said third-party 
offer so long as the amount received by defendant for his equity 
is no less than the amount he would have received if a third 
party offer had been accepted. 
b. Until such time as said house and real 
property has been sold, plaintiff should have the right of 
exclusive occupancy and should be responsible for payment of the 
first mortgage obligation. The second mortgage obligation should 
be paid one-half by each of the parties, and in the event that 
either party pays more than one-half, then that party is entitled 
to reimbursement of such excess of the other party' s share at the 
time of the sale of said house and real property, 
c. Each party should be ordered to cooperate in 
any way necessary to expedite and facilitate the sale of said 
house and real property as the proceeds from the sale constitute 
the only major asset of the parties and these proceeds will be 
necessary to meet various liabilities of the parties for which no 
other funds are immediately available. 
d. Plaintiff has requested that any occupancy of 
the house not occur until after the end of the 1991-1992 school 
year. While the Court finds that it is in the best interests of 
the children that they be allowed to stay in this home through 
the school year, the Court feels that if a sale of the home would 
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be lost by placing this as a condition of sale, that the need of 
the parties to sell this home should take priority and preempt 
any concerns which may exist for the children remaining in the 
home for the duration of the school year. 
6. Personal Property. The personal property of the 
parties should be awarded as follows, with the award to either 
party to be free of any claim of the other: 
a. Each of the parties should be awarded any 
items of furniture and furnishings and personal possessions 
currently in his or her own possession except as otherwise 
expressly hereinafter provided. 
b. Each of the parties should make available to 
the other party any photographs for the purpose of allowing the 
other party to reproduce the photographs at his or her own 
expense or to keep duplicate photographs. 
c. Defendant should be awarded his personal 
property currently located in the home occupied by plaintiff. 
d. Defendant should be awarded his equipment and 
personal property stored in the garage and under the tarp on the 
property currently occupied by plaintiff. 
e. Plaintiff should be awarded the smaller 
Fraughton statuary and the larger Fraughton statuary should be 
placed in the hands of an art dealer on consignment for sale and 
with any net proceeds of sale to be divided between the parties. 
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4-runner. 
Landcruiser. 
trailer, 
truck, 
tack, 
f. Defendant should be awarded the 1984 Toyota 
Plaintiff should be awarded the 1983 Toyota 
Plaintiff should be awarded the horse 
i. Plaintiff should be awarded the 1976 Ford 
Plaintiff should be awarded her horses and 
k. Plaintiff should be awarded the use of the 
snowblower so long as she resides in the Park City area, but it 
should be returned to defendant upon plaintiff moving from the 
Park City area. Defendant should have the right to use the 
snowblower to clear construction sites so long as his use does 
not interfere with plaintiff's need. 
1. Defendant is awarded his stock in Coelho 
Construction Company together with any liabilities. 
m. Plaintiff is awarded her premarital Kodak 
stock. 
n. Plaintiff is awarded the Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield health insurance premium refund and defendant should 
provide whatever cooperation he can in obtaining a new 
replacement check. 
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o. Defendant is awarded the stock in New Classic 
Development together with any liabilities. 
p. Defendant is awarded the parties1 interest in 
Solamere Partnership, together with any liabilities. 
7. Debts and obligations. The liabilities of the 
parties should be assumed and paid as foLlows: 
a. The first and second mortgages on the home at 
5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, should be assumed and paid as set 
forth in paragraph 5 above. 
b* The 1992 income tax Liability of the parties 
should be divided equally between the parties, and the parties 
should cooperate with their accountant, E. J. Passey, in the 
preparation of income tax returns either jointly or separately 
which will provide the lowest total tax liability. Defendant 
should be responsible for and pay for the cost of this tax 
preparation. 
c. Defendant should be responsible for any 
liabilities in connection with Coelho Construction Company, New 
Classic Development and Solamere Partnership. 
d. Each party should be responsible for the 
payment of any liabilities which he or she has individually 
incurred since the separation of the parties in October, 1991. 
8. Income Determination. The Court heard testimony 
from plaintiff concerning her income history and capacity to earn 
income, testimony from two accountants concerning the parties1 
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historical income and defendants income for 1992, a proffer 
concerning defendants current earning capacity, and copies of 
the parties1 tax returns for the past ten years together with 
summaries. The Court having reviewed and considered all the 
evidence, finds that based upon the current circumstances 
defendant has an earning capacity of $5,000 per month and 
plaintiff has an earning capacity of $1,500 per month, and the 
Court's findings related to child support and alimony are based 
upon these income expectancies. 
Specifically, the Court finds that defendant 
is a small independent contractor who has had good years and bad 
years. It appears that 1992 was a good year but the income 
related primarily to one project, and it further appears that 
defendant earned most of the 1992 income during the first part of 
the year, with very little income for the last part of the year 
and with no income for the first month of 1993. It is because of 
these circumstances that the Court finds the expectancy for 199 3 
of defendant's income is the amount of $5,000 per month. 
Specifically, the Court finds that plaintiff 
is currently working at employment as a ski instructor and 
working with disabled children, earning an income substantially 
below what she has historically earned when she was active as a 
real estate sales person during the 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 
years, as reflected in plaintiff's own Exhibit 11. It is 
anticipated that plaintiff should be able to become more 
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gainfully employed and after a short period of time earn an 
income sufficient to meet her own needs based upon her 
demonstrated ability. 
9. Child Support. Consistent with the Child Support 
Guidelines of the State of Utah, the income determinations set 
forth in paragraph 8, and the custody arrangement between the 
parties as set forth in paragraph 4 above, defendant should pay 
to plaintiff as child support the sum of $619 per month, 
commencing with the month of February, 1993, as shown on the 
Child Support Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "A". As a 
further obligation of support, defendant should be responsible to 
maintain the children on his currently-held health and accident 
insurance which has a $500 deductible and each of the parties 
should be responsible for one-half of all non-insured medical 
expenses incurred by any of the three children. 
Defendant should have the further obligation to 
pay to plaintiff one-half of any child care costs which she 
incurs which are work related. Plaintiff shall provide to 
defendant an accounting at the end of each month of the time and 
cost of child care. Defendant should then pay to plaintiff one-
half of said amount within ten days of receipt of the accounting. 
The Court finds that Tony is currently in need of 
therapy, and to the extent that expenses are incurred for 
necessary therapy as that necessity is indicated by his 
therapist, the cost of this therapy should be paid 70% by 
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defendant and 30% by plaintiff- This proration is roughly 
equatable to the proration of income between the parties and, 
further, takes into consideration the fact that plaintiff should 
have some substantial responsibility for the cost of therapy as 
she has control of determining how often therapy is received. 
The parties have stipulated that Sara should be 
seen by a mutually-acceptable therapist on the basis of once a 
month and in the event of any opinion of the therapist that more 
therapy is required, then as often as necessary, with each of the 
parties to be responsible for one-half of the therapy. The 
choice of a mutually-acceptable therapist for Sara should be 
determined by the parties in consultation with Dr. Sam Goldstein. 
Any therapy for Sara with Michelle Miller should be paid by 
defendant. The division of this cost equally between the parties 
is different than the division related to Tony's therapy for the 
reason that defendant shall be responsible for all of the costs 
of Michelle Miller, who is the current therapist for Sara. 
Any obligation for payment of support or medical 
or therapy expenses shall continue so long as the children are 
minors and thereafter to high school graduation for any child who 
turns 18 prior to graduation. 
10. Life Insurance. So long as he has an obligation 
for the payment of child support, defendant should be ordered to 
maintain a life insurance policy in the face amount of $250,000 
naming either the plaintiff's father, the plaintiff's mother or a 
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corporate fiduciary as the trustee for the benefit of the parties 
three children. 
11. Alimony. Based upon the findings which the Court 
has previously set forth above and based upon the living expenses 
of the parties as set forth in their respective exhibits, 
defendant should pay to plaintiff as alimony the sum of $1,000 a 
month commencing with the month of February, 1993, and continuing 
for a period of one year to allow plaintiff the opportunity to 
reestablish her income based upon her demonstrated historical 
earning capacity. At that time, plaintiff should have the right 
to petition the Court for a reevaluation to determine whether 
alimony should be terminated at that time or extended based upon 
the circumstances then existing. 
12. Restoration of maiden name. Plaintiff has 
requested and should be restored to her previous surname of Van 
Siclen. 
13. Attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff proffered 
evidence of attorneys1 fees which she had incurred with her prior 
attorney Mary Corporon and with her present attorney Evelyn R. 
Saunders and the Court having considered the reasonableness of 
the fees and the relative ability of the parties to meet the cost 
of attorneyfs fees and taking into consideration that defendant 
shall be responsible for all his own fees, finds that it is 
reasonable that defendant should be responsible for payment of 
$3,000 to plaintiff for her attorneys1 fees and costs incurred in 
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this action, which amount should be paid within 12 0 days from the 
11th day of February, 1993, or upon sale of the house and real 
property of the parties, whichever occurs first. 
14. Permanent restraining order. Each of the parties 
should be permanently restrained from in any way harassing, 
threatening or harming the other. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, which 
Decree shall become final upon signing and entry. 
2. Custody and visitation is awarded as set forth in 
paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact. 
3. The real property of the parties shall be sold and 
divided as provided in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact. 
4. The personal property ot the parties is awarded as 
provided in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact. 
5. The debts and obligations of the parties shall be 
assumed and paid as provided in paragraph 7 of the Findings of 
Fact. 
6. Plaintiff is awarded child support from defendant 
as provided in paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact. 
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7. Defendant shall maintain life insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children as provided in paragraph 10 of the 
Findings of Fact. 
8. Plaintiff is awarded alimony from defendant as 
provided in paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact. 
9. Plaintiff is restored to her maiden name of Van 
Siclen. 
10. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys1 fees and costs 
from defendant in the amount of $3,000 to be paid as provided in 
paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact. 
11. Each of the parties is permanently restrained from 
in any way harassing, threatening or harming the other. 
12. Each of the parties is ordered to execute any 
documents and cooperate in any way necessary to effectuate the 
terms of the Decree of Divorce when it is entered. 
DATED this ^z^r'day of L^fJVA , 1993_ 
BY THE COURT: ^ ' ^'K^fSp^ 
*«. 
\
 C •••-imixxxf Y 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of April, 1993, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW to: 
Evelyn Saunders 
401 Main Street 
P. O. Box 3418 
Park City, UT 84060 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
lA j f l /Tw^f -^N. \}V\liA L0L 
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B. L. DART (818) "EXHIBIT A" 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
MARY COELHO, : 
Plaintiff, : CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET 
(SPLIT CUSTODY) 
V. : 
ALCIDES J. COELHO, : Civil No. 11093 
Defendant. : Judge Young 
oooOooo 
I BASE AWARD CALCULATION 
I l. Number of Children 
I) 2 . % Children w/each parent 
|| 3a. Gross Monthly Income 
|| 3b. Pre-Existing Alimony 
|| 3c. Pre-Existing Support 
|| 4. Adjusted Monthly Gross 
5. Base Combined Child 
|| Support from Tables 
|| 6. Proportionate Share % 
1 7. Parent's Share Support $ 
|| 8. Mother owes father 
|| 9. Father owes mother 
10. Children's health || insurance premiums paid 
|| ll. Child care expense | 
I 12. NET OBLIGATIONS 
13. BASE SUPPORT AWARD all 
|| 12 months (father to mother) 
1 14. CHILD CARE at 50% [ 
| MOTHER 
2 
.67 
1,500.00 
!
 1,500.00 
lllll 
0.23 
323.61 
106.79 
///// 
106.79 
///// 1 
I 
1 FATHER 
1 
.33 
5,000.00 
5,000.00 
///// 
0.77 
1,083.39 
lllll 
125.SI 
725.87 
///// 1 
[ COMBINED |i 
3 
11111
 I 11111
 l ///// I 
6,500.00 
1,407.00 
11111
 I 11111
 I 
11111
 I 
o.oo 1 
11111
 1 
619.08 
0.00 I 
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No. 
F I L E D 
APR 29 1393 
Clerk of Summit County A ^ , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY COELHO, 
vs. 
ALCIDES J. COELHO, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
RULING 4-501 UCJA 
CASE # 91-11093 
The Court has reviewed the Objections of the plaintiff and the Reply of the 
Defendant. The Court denies the Objections and approves and enters this date 
the Findings and Decree as submitted. 
Further the Court states that within the plaintiff's Objections there is 
language expressing concern as to the "limited time" allowed for the hearing. The 
Defendant's response in part suggests that the Objections of the Plaintiff are 
designed, in part, to increase the "vulnerability" of the Court's decision on 
appeal. The Court s tates that it too felt concern as to the "time" available for 
trial. The day happened to be a day on which the Chief Justice called a special 
meeting of the Judicial Council of which the undersigned is a member. As it 
tu rned out, I was one and one-half hours late for the meeting. 
In order to consider the magnitude of the concern, the Court invites a 
Motion for a New Trial to be filed and argued if that remains a concern. The court 
notes that there was no timely objection to the procedure on the day of the trial 
but nevertheless would like to consider the present concerns of the parties as to 
the adequacy of their presentations. Neither party should presume as to the 
Court 's present view in considering a New Trial. The present concern of the Court 
000330 
is to determine if either party believes they did not have a adequate opportunity 
to present their case and each should state what they would request , if anything, 
to be further presented to the court. 
Dated, April 29, 1993. x ' ^ A ? ' / ? J ^ v 
C.C. to counsel 
= o; 
5P; 
\ o>-"-f V 
'<£OTAV>' 
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COELHO VS. COELHO 
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S INCOME FROM REAL ESTATE SALES 
AS SHOWN ON TAX RETURNS - FORM 1040 
1983 - 1991 
TAX YEAR 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
GROSS INCOME 
- 0 -
$15,754.13 
60,123.79 
35,419.08 
36,628.04 
41,877.73 
24,252.48 
6,103.36 
2,975.00 
AVERAGE YEARLY INCOME: 
(1983-1991) 
AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME: 
BUSINESS EXPENSES 
- 0 -
$ 2,892.00 
5,148.00 
10,114.00 
10,243.00 
8,154.00 
15,692.00 
5,068.00 
3,959.00 
$17,984.77 
$ 1,498.73 
NET INCOME 
- 0 -
$ 12,862.00 
54,976.00 
25,305.00 
26,385.00 
33,724.00 
8,560.00 
1,035.00 
(984.001 
$161,863.00 
A-L 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
TOTALS 
SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL INCOME OP PARTIES 
Coelho v. Coelho 
(From tax returns) 
Al 
$22,690 
33,512 
3,104 
25,426 
3,842 
85,015 
91,610 
90,913 
45,062 
$401,174 
Mary 
$2,625 
13,187 
67,976 
39,305 
42,385 
33,724 
8,560 
376 
1,603 
$209,741 
Misc. 
$(13,579) 
(3,083) 
(2,456) 
(8,597) 
(7,737) 
2,497 
1,566 
1,390 
(2,449) 
AGI 
$(32,448) 
$11,736 
43,616 
68,624 
56,134 
38,490 
121,236 
101,736 
92,679 
44,216 
$578,467 
KtPEFENbANTSi 
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DEFENDANTS PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
Coelho v, Coelho 
Marv Al 
^ouse and real property at 
5328 Old Ranch Rd. , Park City 
2Furniture and furnishings 
(as divided with exceptions; 
see footnote) 
3Two pieces Fraughton statuary 
41984 Toyota 4-runner 
51983 Toyota Landcruiser 
6Horse trailer 
71976 Ford truck 
8Two horses and tack 
9Snowblower 
10Coelho Construction Company 
n50 shares Kodak stock 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
health ins. premium refund 
New Classic Development 
Liabilities: 
1992 Income taxes due per 
joint return prepared by 
Foote & Passey—$15,391 
12Solamere Partnership interest 
TOTAL VALUES 
1/2 
1/2 
4,700 
2,500 
1,000 
1,500 
1,183 
1/2 
$10,883 
1/2 
1/2 
4,800 
2,697 
1/2 
$7,497 
Explanatory notes: 
1. The parties1 home was appraised in the fall of 1992 at 
$3 00,000. There is a first mortgage to Valley National 
Mortgage of $137,013 as of 12/31/92 and a line of credit to 
Valley Bank with a balance of $34,391 as of 3/31/92. 
Defendant would propose that plaintiff be allowed to receive 
this property at the appraised value subject to the two 
mortgage obligations and the payment to defendant of $64,298 
by April 15, 1993. 
Both of the parties have expressed the opinion that the home 
is worth in excess of $300,000 and if plaintiff does not 
desire or cannot exercise the above option, then the home 
should be listed and sold and after payment of first and 
second mortgages and costs of sale the net proceeds should 
be divided between the parties. 
The house should be listed for sale by a real estate agent 
to be mutually agreed upon between the parties and at a 
price recommended by that real estate agent and with date of 
possession on sale not to be restricted based upon current 
cash needs of the parties. 
2. Defendant consents that plaintiff can have the furniture and 
furnishings located in the family home for her benefit and 
the benefit of the minor children. Defendant would request 
the following items of personal property: 
a. Access to all photographs for purposes of reproduction 
and/or duplicates. 
b. All of defendant's personal property currently located 
in the home. 
c. The equipment and personal property stored in the 
garage and under the tarp on the property. 
3. At the temporary hearing it was agreed these pieces of 
statuary would be sold. The pieces should be placed in the 
hands of an art dealer on consignment and any net proceeds 
should be divided between the parties. 
4. Kelly Blue Book average trade-in value. 
5. Kelly Blue Book average trade-in value. 
6. Value from plaintiff's Financial Declaration. 
Value from plaintiff's Financial Declaration. 
Value from plaintiff's Financial Declaration. 
Plaintiff may retain the use of the snowblower so long as 
she resides at the Ranch Road residence. The snowblower is 
an asset of defendant's construction company and should 
returned to defendant upon plaintiff moving from the Ranch 
Road home. 
Per Financial Statement 12/31/92. 
This was plaintiff's premarital asset. 
Defendant will accept this interest subject to any 
liability. 
